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GRANDPARENT VISITATION: THE ONE AND ONLY
STANDARD-BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD. Fairbanks
v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 622 A.2d 121 (1993).

I.

INTRODUCTION

A special relationship often develops between children and their
grandparents. Despite the unique nature of this bond, it is often
hard for such relationships to endure changes in the family unit.
Even during the most civil of divorces, for example, the sensitive
issue of child visitation may result in bitterness and resentment among
the parties involved. These parties include not only the parents and
the children, but quite often the grandparents. The issue of whether
grandparents are entitled to visitation privileges, and under what
circumstances, has recently surfaced in Fairbanks v. McCarter, I a
1993 Maryland court of appeals decision. In Fairbanks, the court
interpreted Maryland's grandparent visitation statute2 to require only
that a trial court determine whether grandparental visitation is in the
child's best interest. 3 The court also held that the Maryland statutory
provision does not require grandparents seeking visitation rights to
demonstrate any exceptional circumstances. 4
In Fairbanks, the parents of two minor children divorced in
1988. 5 The divorce proceedings ended three years later, and a decree
was rendered granting joint legal custody to the parents. 6 The decree

I. 330 Md. 39, 622 A.2d 121 (1993).
·2. 1991 Md. Laws ch. 247 (current version at MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9102 (Supp. 1994».
3. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 49, 622 A.2d at 126.
4. [d. at 48, 622 A.2d at 126. Common law required the existence of exceptional
circumstances before visitation rights could be granted to grandparents. See
infra notes 23-29 and accompanying text (discussing exceptional circumstances
standard and providing examples of exceptional circumstances).
5. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 43, 622 A.2d at 123.
6. [d. The term "joint custody" consists of two distinct concepts: (1) legal custody
and (2) physical custody. Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 296, 508 A.2d 964,
967 (1986). "Legal custody carries with it the right and obligation to make
long range decisions involving education, religious training, discipline, medical
care, and other matters of major significance concerning the child's life and
welfare." [d. With joint legal custody, both parents have an equal voice in
making such decisions, and neither parent's rights are superior to the other.
[d.; see infra note 7 (discussing physical custody).
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named the father as the custodial parene while the mother retained
the right to visit the children every other weekend, two weeks during
the summer, and on certain holidays.8
The paternal grandparents saw the children frequently throughout the week while the children were with their father. 9 The maternal
grandparents, on the other hand, usually saw their grandchildren
only every other Sunday, while the children were with their mother,
for a family dinner .10 There were no provisions for grandparental
visitation in the divorce agreement. 11 Unhappy with this arrangement,
the maternal grandparents filed a complaint against the father seeking
independent visitation rights of the children. 12 They alleged that the
father would not voluntarily expand the time that the children might
spend with them,13 and thus, they were unable to continue establishing
a meaningful relationship with their grandchildren. 14 The father answered the complaint by stating that the maternal grandparents had
adequate access to the children when the children visited their mother .15
At the subsequent hearing, however, the mother testified that she no
longer wanted to share her limited visitation time with her parents. 16
At that hearing, the judge denied the maternal grandparents'
petition for visitation rights,, 7 The court determined that there were

7. As the custodial parent, the father was given physical custody of the children.
Physical custody involves the "right and obligation to provide a home for the
child and to make the day-to-day decisions required during the time the child
is actually with the parent having such custody." Taylor, 306 Md. at 296-97,
508 A.2d at 967 (1986).
8. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 43, 622 A.2d at 123.
9.
10.
II.
12.

13.
14.
15.
16.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. The complaint was filed in the Circuit Court for Dorchester County,

Maryland. The complaint alleged that, since the divorce, the defendant had
engaged in a continuous pattern of behavior that prevented the grandparents
from having reasonable visitation with the children. Complaint for Visitation
Rights at E.2, Fairbanks (No. C2241).
Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 43, 622 A.2d at 123.
Complaint for Visitation Rights at E.2, Fairbanks (No. C2241).
Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 43, 622 A.2d at 123.
[d. It is unclear why the mother took this position. She may have genuinely
decided that she did not have enough time with the children to afford sharing
any of her time with the maternal grandparents. The decision, on the. other
hand, may have been the result of ill feelings between the mother and her
parents. The court raised a red flag at the end of its opinion concerning this
issue. [d. at 50, 622 A.2d at 127. The court stated: "[f]inally, without in any
way inferring its presence in this case, a petition for grandparental visitation
must not. foster collusion between grandparents and a non-custodial parent
seeking to undo a prior decree and win greater access to the child in question."

[d.
17. [d. at 44, 622 A.2d at 123.
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no exceptional circumstances 18 to warrant any additional visitation
orders. 19 The maternal grandparents appealed and, on its own initiative, the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari prior to
intermediate appellate review. 20 The court of appeals held that the
absence of exceptional circumstances was irrelevant. 21 Maryland's
highest court determined that the standard for grandparental visitation in Maryland is not predicated on whether exceptional circumstances exist, but rather, solely on the child's best interestY
II.

BACKGROUND

At common law, prior to the enactment of grandparent visitation
statutes, grandparents possessed no independent right to visit their
grandchildren unless either the parents of the child consented to such
visitation or exceptional circumstances were determined to exist by a
court. 23 Grandparents' interests were moral, not legal,24 As a result,
the child's parents maintained virtual autonomy in deciding whether
the grandparents could visit the grandchildren; judicial oversight was
minimal. In the absence of exceptional circumstances, granting visitation privileges to the grandparents over the objection of a parent
constituted reversible error. 25 Thus, where the parents refused visitation rights to the grandparents, the grandparents were without legal
recourse unless exceptional circumstances were present. Exceptional
circumstances included situations where a parent had died,26 a parent
was declared unfit,27 a father was on duty in the armed forces,28 and
where a parent had abandoned the child. 29
18. See infra notes 23-29 and accompanying text (discussing the exceptional circumstances standard used at common law).
19. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 44, 622 A.2d at 124.
20. /d.

21. Id. at 48, 622 A.2d at 126.
22. /d. at 49, 622 A.2d at 126.
23. See Succession of Reiss, 15 So. 151, 152 (La. 1894); Phyllis C. Borzi, Note,
Statutory Visitation Rights of Grandparents: One Step Closer to the Best
Interests of the Child, 26 CATH. U. L. REV. 387-89 (1977) (stating that the
parents' decision controlled unless the grandparent could prove that the custodial parent was unfit); Patricia S. Fernandez, Grandparent Access: A Model
Statute, 6 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 109, 114 (1988) (stating that grandparents
had no judicially enforceable right of access to the grandchildren when they
were in the custody of their parents unless exceptional circumstances existed).
24. Fernandez, supra note 23, at 114.
25. Lingwall v. Hoener, 464 N.E.2d 1248, 1249 (III. App. Ct. 1984) (citing Chodzko
v. Chodzko, 360 N.E.2d 60 (1976»; see also supra note 23 and accompanying
text.
26. Boyles v. Boyles, 302 N.E.2d 199, 201 (III. App. Ct. 1973).
27. Succession of Reiss, 15 So. 151, 152 (La. 1894).
28. Solomon v. Solomon, 49 N.E.2d 807, 808 (III. App. Ct. 1943).
29. Benner v. Benner, 248 P.2d 425, 426 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952).
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Policy reasons for the common-law rule included the notion that
judicial enforcement of grandparental visitation would further divide
the family unit as well as hinder parental authority. 30 Thus, the
child's best interest could not be served by forcing the child into the
"midst of a conflict of authority and ill feelings between parent and
grandparent. "31
Furthermore, under the common law, grandparents' rights were
considered derivative. 32 In other words, the grandparents' rights
stemmed from a corresponding right enjoyed by the parent. 33 Therefore, the paternal grandparents could visit the child during the
father's visitation time and the maternal grandparents could visit the
child during the mother's visitation time. If a parent did not have
visitation privileges, then neither did his or her parents.
Over time, state legislatures began to reject the common-law
rule. Today, all fifty states have enacted statutes authorizing courts
to grant visitation rights to grandparents under certain circumstances. 34
30. Annotation, Grandparent Visitation Rights, 90 A.L.R.3D 222, 225-26 (1979).
31. Id. at 226.
32. See In re Adoption of a Child, 355 A.2d 211,212 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1976) (stating that grandparents' rights are derivative through the natural parent
unless there is legislation to the contrary).
.
33. Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39,48-49, 622 A.2d 121, 126 (1993).
34. See ALASKA STAT. § 30-3-4 (1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-337.01 (1994);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103 (Michie 1994); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3103 (West
1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-117 (1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 466-59
(West 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1031 (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.01
(West 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3 (1994); HAW.' REV. STAT. § 571-46
(1993); IDAHO CODE § 32-719 (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 11-7.1
(Smith-Hurd 1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.7.2 (West 1994); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 598.35 (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-129 (1993); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 405.021 (Baldwin 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344 (West 1993); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1001-05 (West 1994); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§ 9-102 (Supp. 1994); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 119, § 39D (1994); MICH. COMPo
LAWS ANN. § 722.27b (West 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West 1994);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-16-1 (1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.402 (Vernon 1993);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-9-102 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1802 (1993); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 432B.56O (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17 ca (1993); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-2 (Michie 1994);
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2, 5013.2A (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3109.051 (Baldwin 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5 (West 1994); OR.
REV. STAT. § 109.121 (1993); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5311-14 (1994);
R.l. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-24.3 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420 (Law. Co-op
1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-4-52 (1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6301 (1994); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.03 (West 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. §
30-5-2 (1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1011 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 20107.2 (Michie 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 09.240 (West 1994); W. VA.
CODE § 48-26-1 (1994); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.245 (West 1993); Wyo. STAT.
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Legislative history surrounding the passage of these statutes is
virtually nonexistent. 3s These statutes, however, are likely a result of
increasing divorce rates 36 and the strong lobbying efforts of grandparents. 37 As divorce often results in both the physical and emotional
division of a family, a custodial parent may very well deny the exspouse's parents any opportunity to visit the grandchildren, even
where a strong relationship had previously existed between that
grandparent and grandchild. 38 Grandparent visitation statutes protect
the ties between grandchildren and their grandparents and recognize
the nurturing relationship that often exists between them. 39 The
grandparent-grandchild relationship may be especially important to
a child when divorce divides the nuclear family.40
Maryland's first statute specifically addressing grandparental visitation rights was enacted in 1981.41 Under section 3-602(a)(4) of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Annotated
Code, a court of equity could:
[d]etermine who shall have visitation rights to a child. At
any time following the termination of a marriage, the court
may consider a petition for reasonable visitation by one or
more of the grandparents of a natural or adopted child of
the parties whose marriage has been terminated, and may

§ 20-7-101 (1994); see also Fernandez, supra note 23, at 117; Kristen Jones

35.
36.
37.

38.
39.

40.

41.

Indermark, Note, Permissive Intervention-Grandparents' Key to Entering
Adoption Proceedings, 26 GA. L. REV. 787, 829 n.165 (1992).
Borzi, supra note 23, at 393.
Fernandez, supra note 23, at 115.
See Megan Rosenfeld, Grandparents' Rights: Activists Turn to Court to Protect
Their Ties to Grandchildren, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1991, at Z12. The number
of grandparents is growing. It is estimated that as of 1991 there were 58 million
grandparents, and in the year 2001 there will be 98 million. Id. For a further
discussion of possible factors influencing the creation of grandparent visitation
statutes, see Fernandez, supra note 23, at 115-17.
See Fernandez, supra note 23, at 115.
Cf Anne Marie Jackson, Comment, The Coming of Age of Grandparent
Visitation Rights, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 563, 591 (1994) (stating that guidelines
for grandparental visitation should consider the nature of the relationship
between the grandparent and the child, including whether the relationship was
"a nurturing, caring, relationship").
Grandparents can comprise a secondary support system or a "safety net" for
grandchildren when the child's nuclear family divides. Indermark, supra note
34, at 806-07. During such transitional times, grandparents may offer a calming
influence on the grandchildren and provide needed stability. Fernandez, supra
note 23, at 110.
1981 Md. Laws ch. 276 (repealed and reenacted by 1984 Md. Laws ch. 296, §
9-101; renumbered at 1984 Md. Laws ch. 529 § 9-102; current version at MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (Supp. 1994».
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grant such visitation if the court believes it to be in the best
interests of the child .... 42
Prior to 1981, this section did not specifically include the language
regarding grandparents. Rather, section 3-602(a)(4) simply stated that
a court of equity could "determine who shall have visitation rights
to a child."43 "[S]ection 3-602(a)(4), prior to the 1981 amendment,
constituted the broadest possible grant of authority to courts to
determine who shall be awarded visitation rights."44 Inherent in this
broad language was the right of a court to grant visitation rights to
grandparents. 45 Nevertheless, in 1981, the legislature added language
to the statute specifying grandparents as possible candidates for such
visitation rights. 46
The evolution of this statute, as well as its legislative history,
was examined in Skeens v. Paterno ,47 a 1984 Maryland court of
special appeals decision. In Skeens, an unmarried minor, Debra
Skeens, gave birth to the child of Jeffrey Paterno. 48 After learning
of the pregnancy, Paterno proposed to Skeens, but she declined
Paterno's offer of marriage. 49 Skeens subsequently decided to place
the child up for adoption. 50 Three days after the child was born,
Paterno brought suit to enjoin Skeens from proceeding with any
action relative to the child's adoption and also requested custody of
the child. 51 During the course of the ensuing litigation, the adoption
issue was withdrawn, leaving only the custody issue. 52
The trial court awarded custody to Skeens with liberal visitation
rights to Paterno. 53 Because Paterno was an enlisted member of the
42. Id.
43. 1975 Md. Laws ch. 317 § 3-602(a)(4) (current version at MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAW § 9-102 (Supp. 1994)}.
·44. Evans v. Evans, 302 Md. 334, 339,488 A.2d 157, 159 (1985).
45. See id. at 339-43, 488 A.2d at 159-61; Skeens v. Paterno, 60 Md. App. 48,
60, 480 A.2d 820, 826 (1984), overruled by Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md.
39, 622 A.2d 121 (1993).
46. 1981 Md. Laws ch. 276 (repealed and reenacted by 1984 Md. Laws ch. 296, §
9-101; renumbered by 1984 Md. Laws ch. 529 § 9-102; current version at MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (Supp. 1994)} (clarifying that a court may
grant visitation rights to grandparents of a child). Senate Bill 333 was a
"culmination of a four-year effort to enact legislation to afford visitation
rights to grandparents." Evans, 302 Md. at 339, 488 A.2d at 159 (referring to
S.B. 333, 1981 Sess. (Md. 1981».
47. 60 Md. App. 48, 480 A.2d 820 (1984), overruled by Fairbanks v. McCarter,
330 Md. 39, 622 A.2d 121 (1993).
48. Id. at 53, 480 A.2d at 822.
49. Id.
50. Id.
5!. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. The trial court stated in its order that the father was entitled to visitation
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United States Navy, however, his parents were granted vIsItation
rights with the child while their son was away on duty.54 The court
of special appeals affirmed the lower court's decision to award the
paternal grandparents such visitation privileges due to the exceptional
circumstances. 55
The Skeens court applied the grandparent visitation statute,
section 3-602(a)(4).56 The court of special appeals recognized that,
under the statute, the "ultimate test for custody and visitation is the
best interests of the child. "57 The' court stated further that custody
should be granted to a grandparent, as against a parent, only in the
presence of exceptional circumstances. 58 The same requirement "may
also be true as, to grandparental visitation." 59 The court held that

54.
55.

56.

57.
58.
59.

with the child at least "two consecutive days and nights per week, alternating
major holidays of New Years, Easter, Memorial Day, Thanksgiving and Christmas and six consecutive weeks during the summer months of June, July and
August of each year." Id. at 55, 480 A.2d at 823.
Id.
[d. at 61-62, 480 A.2d at 826-27. The court of appeals denied the Skeens'
petition for writ of certiorari. Skeens v. Paterno, 301 Md. 639, 484 A.2d 274
(1984).
1981 Md. Laws ch. 276 (repealed and reenacted by 1984 Md. Laws ch. 296, §
9-101; renumbered by 1984 Md. Laws ch. 529 § 9-102; current version at MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (Supp. 1994». The Skeenses contended that §
3-602(a)(4) of the Maryland Code was not applicable in this case since Debra
Skeens and Paterno had never married. Skeens, 60 Md. App. at 58-60, 480
A.2d at 825-26. They argued that the 1981 amendment to § 3-602(a)(4) limited
a court's authority to grant grandparental visitation in only those situations
where a marriage had terminated. Id. at 58, 480 A.2d at 825. The court,
however, rejected the Skeenses contention. Id. at 59-61, 480 A.2d at 825-26.
Although the court conceded that the statute could be subject to such an
interpretation, the court ultimately held that § 3-602(a)(4) "does no more than
restate existing law as to grandpa rental visitation rights in a termination of
marriage context." Id. at 59-61, 480 A.2d at 825-26. Thus, the statute does
not limit the power of a court in considering requests by grandparents for
custody and visitation under other circumstances. Id. at 61, 480 A.2d at 826.
/d.
/d.,
[d. (citations omitted). The court's proposal that grandparental visitation should
be based upon exceptional circumstances is dictum. Fairbanks v. McCarter,
330 Md. 39, 48, 622 A.2d 121, 126 (1993). The court did not explore this
proposition further because it determined that the father's absence on naval
duty constituted an exceptional circumstance. Skeens, 60 Md. App. at 61, 480
A.2d at 826. Therefore, because this exceptional circumstance existed, the court
automatically awarded the paternal grandparents visitation privileges. Id. at
61-62,480 A.2d at 826-27.
In support of this dictum, the court made an analogy between visitation
and custody-':"since exceptional circumstances are required to grant custody to
a grandparent over a parent, such circumstances are also required to grant
visitation rights to grandparents. [d. at 61, 480 A.2d at 826; see also infra
notes 64-65 and accompanying text (discussion of exceptional circumstance
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the father's absence on naval duty constituted such an exceptional
circumstance. 60 The only way the child could maintain contact with
the paternal side of the family was through Paterno's parents. 61
Skeens is significant to Maryland law because the court pronounced an exceptional circumstances requirement in the context of
grandparental visitation despite the absence of such a requirement in
the plain language of section 3-602(a)(4).62 It appears that the court
adopted the exceptional circumstances requirement from custody law
and incorporated that principle into the realm of grandparental
visitation. 63 At the time Skeens was decided, it had been well established by the Maryland courts that exceptional circumstances were
required to grant custody of a child to a third party over the biological
parent. 64 That requirement still exists today based upon the same
presumption that as between a biological parent and a third party,
the child's best interests are best served by granting custody to the
parent unless exceptional circumstances are present. 65

60.
61.
62.

63.
64.
65.

requirement in custody law). The court also relied on Chodzko v. Chodzko,
360 N.E.2d 60 (Ill. 1976), and In re Adoption of a Child, 355 A.2d 211 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976). Skeens, 60 Md. App. at 61, 480 A.2d at 826. Since
Skeens was decided, however, Chodzko has been effectively overruled by the
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40,
para. 607(b) (1983) (The statute provides that "the court may grant reasonable
visitation privileges to a grandparent ... if the court determines that it is in
the best interests and welfare of the child. "). Special circumstances are no
longer a necessary prerequisite in awarding grandparents visitation rights in
Illinois. The statute "enlarges the power to grant grandparent visitation beyond
that which existed at common law." Lingwall v. Hoener, 464 N.E.2d 1248,
1249 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). Likewise, one year after In re Adoption oj a Child
was decided, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, held that
grandparents' rights are not derivative. Bennett v. Bennett, 376 A.2d 191, 193
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977). The granting of such rights depends solely
upon whether it is in the best interest of the child. Id.
Skeens, 60 Md. App. at 61, 480 A.2d at 826.
Id. at 61, 480 A.2d 826-27.
Compare Skeens, 60 Md. App. at 61-62, 480 A.2d at 826-27 (determining that
the father's absence on naval duty was an exceptional circumstance and
awarding visitation rights to the grandparents) with 1981 Md. Laws ch. 276
(repealed and reenacted by 1984 Md. Laws ch. 296, § 9-101; renumbered by
1984 Md. Laws ch. 529 § 9-102; current version at MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 9-102 (Supp. 1994» (setting forth as the only requirement for grandparental visitation "the best interest of the child").
See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
See Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 177-78, 372 A.2d 582, 586-87 (1977).
"When the dispute is between a biological parent and a third party, it is
presumed that the child's best interest is subserved by custody to the parent.
That presumption is overcome and such custody will be denied if (a) the parent
is unfit to have custody, or (b) if there are such exceptional circumstances as
[to] make such custody detrimental to the best interest of the child." Id. at
178-79, 372 A.2d at 587. The burden of proof is on the third party. Id. at
178, 372 A.2d at 587.
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Skeens was the first Maryland appellate case to suggest that such
a presumption also exists with grandparental visitation. 66 In other
words, Skeens suggested that without exceptional circumstances, the
child's interests were presumably best served by granting visitation
only to the child's parents, not the grandparents.6' Since the Skeens
decision in 1984, neither the legislature nor the courts had affirmed
or disputed the requirement of exceptional circumstances in the
context of grandparental visitation until Fairbanks v. McCarter6 8 in
1993. Before Fairbanks was decided, though, Maryland's grandparent
visitation statute underwent two non-substantive changes, neither of
which affected the Skeens exceptional circumstances requirement.
The Maryland General Assembly first moved the visitation statute, in 1984, from section 3-602 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article69 to section 9-102 of the Family Law Article. 70 While in
the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, the grandparent visitation statute was part of a broad section entitled "Custody, Guardianship, Maintenance, and Support of a Child. "71 As a result of the
move to the Family Law Article, however, the visitation statute stood
alone and was entitled "Petition by Grandparents for Visitation."72
A second change, made by the Maryland legislature in 1991,
was clarifying in nature. The previous statute authorized an equity
court to grant visitation rights to a grandparent after "termination
of a [parents'] marriage."73 The 1991 amendment added language to
the statute to clarify the court's power to consider a petition for
visitation by a grandparent "after the termination of a marriage by
divorce, annulment, or death."74 Fairbanks v. McCarter,7S decided
two years later, examined Maryland's grandparent visitation statute
in light of the 1991 amendment. 76 The 1991 amended version of
section 9-102 read as follows:

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 48, 622 A.2d 121, 126 (1993).
See Skeens v. Paterno, 60 Md. App. 48, 61, 480 A.2d 820, 826 (1984).
330 Md. 39, 622 A.2d 121 (1993).
1981 Md. Laws ch. 276 §3-602(a)(4).
Chapter 296 of the 1984 Maryland Laws recodified § 3-602(a)(4) of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article as § 9-101 of the Family Law Article. 1984
Md. Laws ch. 296. Later that same year, the legislature renumbered that section
as 9-102. 1984 Md. Laws ch. 529.
1981 Md. Laws ch. 276 § 3-602(a)(4).
1984 Md. Laws ch. 529 § 9-102 (current version at MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 9-102 (Supp. 1994».
1984 Md. Laws ch. 529 § 9-102.
1991 Md. Laws ch. 247 (current version at MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9102 (Supp. 1994».
330 Md. 39, 622 A.2d 121 (1993).
[d. at 46-48, 622 A.2d at 125-27.
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At any time after the termination of a marriage by divorce,
annulment, or death, an equity court may:
(1) consider a petition for reasonable visitation by a
grandparent of a natural or adopted child of the parties
whose marriage has been terminated; and
(2) if the court finds it to be in the best interests of
the child, grant visitation rights to the grandparent. 77
After the decision in Fairbanks v. McCarter, section 9-102
underwent yet another change-grandparents may now petition a
court for visitation rights even though the nuclear family is intact. 78
"An equity court may: (1) consider a petition for reasonable visitation
of a grandchild by a grandparent; and (2) if the court finds it to be
in the best interests of the child, grant visitation rights to the
grandparent. "79 The marital status of the parents is now irrelevant
in determining visitation rights of grandparents. 8o
III.

INSTANT CASE
In Fairbanks v. McCarter, 81 the trial court did not rely on
Maryland's grandparent visitation statute. Rather, the trial court's
opinion relied primarily on the teachings in Skeens v. Paterno. 82 The
Fairbanks trial court asserted three principles in its opinion:
[T]he first, and probably the most important [principle] to
make note of, is that the ultimate test in any of these cases
is what is in the best interest of the children.
The second of these principles ... is that [when] you
are talking about custody of children, custody awarded to
grandparents as against a parent is only to be granted when
there are exceptional circumstances.
In [Skeens v.] Paterno the Court further notes that that
may also be true with respect to grandparental visitation

. [T]here is at least a [third] principle that absent
other exceptional factors, the visitation or custody with the
77. 1991 Md. Laws ch. 247 (current version at MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9102 (Supp. 1994».
78. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (Supp. 1994); see also Beckman v. Boggs,
No. 78, 1995 WL 119124 (Md. Mar. 22, 1995) (applying 1993 version of
Maryland's grandparent visitation statute).
79. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (Supp. 1994).
80.Id.
81. 330 Md. 39, 622 A.2d 121 (1993).
82. Skeens v. Paterno, 60 Md. App. 48, 480 A.2d 820 (1984), overruled by
Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 48, 622 A.2d 121, 126 (1993).
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grandparents is in substitution of or in lieu of custody or
visitation with the parent . . .. 83
As discussed above,84 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
proposed in Skeens that exceptional circumstances were required in
order to grant visitation rights to grandp~rents. 85 In applying the
principles set forth in Skeens, the trial court in Fairbanks determined
that the issuance of additiondl visitation orders was not in the
children's best interest86 because exceptional circumstances did not
exist. 87 The court maintained that visitation with the maternal grandparents was not necessary.88 The children's mother had visitation
rights and, therefore, the maternal grandparents could visit the
children while they were in their mother's care. 89
The court of appeals disagreed with the trial court's rationale. 90
Maryland's highest court held that, under section 9-102 of the Family
Law Article, grandparents have an independent right to petition the
court for visitation of their grandchildren. 91 According to the court,
grandparents no longer have to prove the existence of exceptional
circumstances when petitioning the court for visitation privileges. 92 A
trial court should be guided exclusively by the best interests of the
grandchildren. 93
In its analysis, the. court of appeals first examined the traditional
rules of statutory construction.94 The court stated that .the words of
a statute must be given their ordinary meaning95 and that a court

83. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 44, 622 A.2d at 124 (citing Skeens, 60 Md. App. at
61, 480 A.2d at 826).
84. See supra text accompanying notes 56-67.
85. Skeens, 60 Md. App. at 61, 480 A.2d at 826.
86. Trial Transcript at 66-67, Fairbanks v. McCarter (No. C4171) (Cir. Ct. Dorchester County, Md.).
87. The trial judge also noted that these children had more contact with their
grandparents, maternal and paternal, than most other children have with their
grandparents. Trial Transcript at 67, Fairbanks (No. C4171).
88. Trial Transcript at 65-66, Fairbanks (No. C4171).
89. Trial Transcript at 66, Fairbanks (No. C4171).
90. Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39,48-49,622 A.2d 121, 126 (1993).
91. [d.; see also Beckman v. Boggs, No. 78, 1995 WL 119124 at *6 (Md. Mar.
22, 1995) (holding that adoption of a child by maternal grandparents in no
way impairs paternal grandparents' independent right to petition for visitation
under § 9-102).
92. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 49, 622 A.2d at 126.
93. [d. The court of appeals also held that it was necessary to join the mother as
a party to the action even though the trial court did not rule on this issue. Id ..
at 46, 622 A.2d at 125.
94. [d. at 46-48, 622 A.2d at 125-26.
95. Id. at 46, 622 A.2d at 125; NCR Corp. v. Comptroller, 313 Md. 118, 124,
544 A.2d 764, 767 (1988); Comptroller v. Fairchild Indus., 303 Md. 230, 284,
493 A.2d 341, 343 (1985).

222

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 24

cannot append additional components to a statute that are not already
expressed in the statute itself. 96
With the guidance of these traditional rules, the court of appeals
held that the language of section 9-102 was clear and unambiguous. 97
The court read the language as granting a court of equity the power
"to consider and award reasonable grandparental visitation in furtherance of the child's best interest. "98 According to the court,
"nothing in the words of [section] 9-102 suggests that only exceptional
circumstances, present as conditions precedent, may justify an award
of visitation to grandparents."99
The lower court, according to the court of appeals, confused
visitation with custody. 100 The trial court's reliance upon Skeens v.
Paterno was misplaced. 101 In Skeens, the court of special appeals
proposed in dictum that grandparental visitation should be based
upon exceptional circumstances, as is the case with grandparental
custody.l02 The court of appeals in Fairbanks stated, however, that
"[v]isitation is a considerably less weighty matter than outright
custody of a child, .and does not demand the enhanced protections,
embodied in the exceptional circumstances test, that attend custody
awards."103 The court therefore ruled that "[t]o the extent that Skeens
v. Paterno indicates a requirement of special circumstances for grandparental visitation, it is disapproved." 104
The coutt also stated that because, under section 9-102, grandparents enjoy an independent right to visitation, these rights are not
derivative. lOS In other words, a grandparent's right to visit a child is
not dependent upon his or her own child's legal rightsYl6

96. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 47-48, 622 A.2d at 125; Harris v. City of Baltimore,

306 Md. 669, 673, 511 A.2d 52, 54 (1986); In re Arnold M., 298 Md. 515,
521, 471 A.2d 313, 315-16 (1984).
97. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 46, 622 A.2d at 125.
98. [d.
99. [d. at 47-48, 622 A.2d at 125. The court noted that other jurisdictions have

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

imposed the requirement of exceptional circumstances in cases dealing with
grandparental visitation. Id. at 48, 622 A.2d at 125 (citing Brown v. Earnhardt,
396 S.E.2d 358 (S.C. 1990); Chodzko v. Chodzko, 360 N.E.2d 60 (III. 1976».
But see discussion supra note 59 (noting that Chodzko has been effectively
overruled).
Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 48-49, 622 A.2d at 126.
See id. at 48, 622 A.2d at 126.
Id.; see supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text (reviewing the Skeens decision
regarding the requirement of exceptional circumstances in grandparent visitation
statutes).
Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 48, 622 A.2d at 126.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 48-49, 622 A.2d at 126.
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Section 9-102 calls for only a consideration of the child's best
interest, according to the Fairbanks court. I07 A trial court, therefore,
must only concern itself with the welfare of the child. In determining
the best interests of the child under section 9-102, the court of
appeals stated that the trial court
should assess in their totality all relevant factors and circumstances pertaining to the grandchild's best interests.
These would include, but not be limited to: the nature and
stability of the child's relationships with its parents; the
nature and substantiality of the relationship between the
child and the grandparent, taking into account frequency
of contact, regularity of contact, and amount of time spent
together; the potential benefits and detriments to the child
in granting the visitation order; the effect, if any, grandparental visitation would have on the child's attachment to
its nuclear family; the physical and emotional health of the
adults involved; and the stability of the child's living and
schooling arrangements. lOS
The court of appeals remanded the Fairbanks case to the trial court,
with neither an affirmance nor a reversal, for proceedings in accordance with its opinion. I09
Judge McAuliffe's concurring opinion agreed with the lower
court on the issue of exceptional circumstances. ltO He believed that
"[u]nder ordinary circumstances and in the usual case, each parent
should be willing and able to include visits with grandparents when
the children are with that parent." III Ordinarily, therefore, it would
be neither necessary nor appropriate to award separate visitation
rights to the grandparents in order to accommodate the child's best
interests. 112 Judge McAuliffe also stated, "[t]here is more than enough
acrimony, heartbreak, expense, and suffering involved in child custody cases now; I am confident the legislature did not intend to
exacerbate this situation by suggesting that grandparental involvement
in custody and visitation disputes should become the norm. "II3
107. Id. at 49, 622 A.2d at 126; see a/so 1991 Md. Laws ch. 247 (current version
at MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (Supp. 1994».
108. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 50, 622 A.2d at 126-27.
109. [d. at 50, 622 A.2d at 127.
110. [d. at 50-51, 622 A.2d at 127 (McAuliffe, J., concurring). Judge McAuliffe
agreed with the majority that the mother should have been joined as a party
to the action but disagreed with the rest of the majority's opinion. See supra
note 93 (noting that the majority held that it was necessary to join the mother
as a party to the action).
111. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 51, 622 A.2d at 127.
112. Id. at 50-51, 622 A.2d at 127.
113. Id. at 51, 622 A.2d at 127.
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Accordingly, Judge McAuliffe agreed with the trial court that
no exceptional circumstances existed in Fairbanks. 114 Judge McAuliffe
noted that the mother had visitation privileges on alternate weekends,
two weeks during the summer, and on certain holidays.1I5 The concurrence also pointed out that the mother and her parents lived in
close proximity and were not estranged. 116 Judge McAuliffe stated
that these circumstances provided the grandparents with adequate
time for visitation. 117 He concluded, therefore, that it would not be
in the children's best interest to award additional visitation privileges
. to the grandparents. I IS
IV .

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

In Fairbanks v. McCarter,119 the Maryland court of appeals
properly decided that under section 9-102 a trial court may grant
grandparental visitation when it is in the child's best interest, despite
a lack of exceptional circumstances. I2O Under the plain language of
section 9-102, the court of appeals had no alternative but to decide
the case as it did. Even a liberal interpretation of the statute would
not reveal an exceptional circumstance requirement for granting
visitation rights to grandparents. 121 The existence of exceptional circumstances, however, may be an influencing factor when a judge is
determining a child's best interest. A court is to consider the totality
of the circumstances. 122 If there is an exceptional circumstance, a
court may be more inclined to grant the grandparents visitation
rights. 123 By the same token, simply because there is not an exceptional circumstance, a court's inquiry is not necessarily complete. As
exemplified in Fairbanks, a court may not automatically conclude
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

119. 330 Md. 39, 622 A.2d 121 (1993).
120. [d. at 49, 622 A.2d at 126.
121. See 1991 Md. Laws ch. 247 (current version at MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §
9-102 (Supp. 1994».
122. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 50, 622 A.2d at 126.
123. See id. (stating that "[t]he trial court must concern itself solely with the welfare
and prospects of the child"). If exceptional circumstances exist, the child may
have a greater need for stability and emotional support. See supra notes 23-29
and accompanying text (discussing exceptional circumstances). A court may
determine that such needs would be best served by awarding the grandparents
of the child visitation rights. Thus, even though the Fairbanks court held that
exceptional circumstances were not required to award visitation rights to
grandparents, the court did not preclude the consideration of such circumstances. See Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 48, 622 A.2d at 126.
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that since no exceptional circumstances exist, an award of grand parental visitation rights is not in the child's best interest. 124 Rather, the
court must consider all of the facts and circumstances to discern the
child's best interest. 125
Not only did the Fairbanks court properly interpret section 9102, but the approach contained in that section represents the best
method for resolving grandparental visitation disputes.
Each case concerning grandparents and grandchildren involves
distinct differences and intricacies. Just as no two people are created
alike, no two relationships develop alike. Furthermore, each case will
unavoidably involve many intangible factors, such as the unique
needs of the child and the strength of the familial relationships. It
is for these reasons that a court, in determining whether to make an
award of grandparental visitation, needs the liberty to use its own
discretion. A judge should not decide whether to award visitation
based solely on one fact or circumstance. The best interest of the
child standard affords a court this flexibility.
Concededly, the best interest of the child standard is not perfect.
"Present methods for determining a child's best interest are timeconsuming [and] involve a multitude of intangible factors that ofttimes are ambiguous."126 It is true that the child's best interest
standard is broad and vague,127 but the very nature of these disputes
requires such a flexible standard.
The sole alternative to the child's best interest approach is a
more mechanical, objective approach. Such an approach would attempt to limit judicial discretion, and thus make the outcome of
such proceedings more predictable and uniform. The exceptional
circumstances approach and the derivative rights approach discussed
above 128 are both examples of a more mechanical approach. Although
124. The court of appeals in Fairbanks v. McCarter listed several factors to guide
a trial court in ascertaining the child's best interest. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 50,
622 A.2d at 126-27; see supra text accompanying note 108. The court stated
that the list is not comprehensive, and also that trial courts should "assess in
their totality all relevant factors and circumstances .... " Fairbanks, 330 Md.
at 50, 622 A.2d at 126. Thus, it appears that no one factor is determinative
of the child's best interests.
125. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 50, 622 A.2d at 126.
126. Montgomery County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 419,
381 A.2d 1154, 1163 (1978).
127. Other criticisms of the child's best interest standard include: the notion that
the standard is actually more focused on the parents' interests rather than the
child's interests; the meaning of the phrase, the "child's best interest," is itself
unclear and undefined; the standard is subject to judicial abuse because of its
vagueness; and litigation is encouraged because of the uncertainty in such
proceedings. Andrea Charlow, A warding Custody: The Best Interests of the
Child and Other Fictions,S YALE L. & POL'y REV. 267, 267-73 (1987).
128. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text (discussing exceptional circum-
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both standards may seek to fulfill the best interests of the child, they
impose additional threshold requirements. 129
The exceptional circumstances standard is too restrictive. It
appears to presume that if exceptional circumstances do not exist,
there is no reason to grant a grandparent visitation rights. A presumption of this sort is not always in a child's best interest. Consider,
for example, the parents of two minor children who divorce. The
mother gains custody of the children and the father visits the children
once a month. The paternal grandparents, who had been very close
with their grandchildren, live two blocks from the mother's house.
After the divorce, the mother decides that she no longer wants her
children visiting the paternal grandparents because of the bitter
feelings that have developed between the mother and the paternal
grandparents. Although the feelings between the mother and the
grandparents have deteriorated, the grandchildren and grandparents
still love each other. In this example, there are no exceptional
circumstances. The father has visitation privileges once a month, so
therefore, the children are able to maintain contact with the paternal
side of the family. Additionally, both parents are alive, both parents
are fit and healthy, and the grandparents live in close proximity to
the mother .130 If the paternal grandparents petition the court for
visitation in a jurisdiction requiring the presence of exceptional
circumstances, their petition would almost certainly be denied. 131 A
judge would automatically deny visitation to the grandparents simply
because of the lack of exceptional circumstances. Under the nonmechanical best interest of the child approach, however, a judge
would explore all of the factors. Only after such a liberal examination

stances standard); supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (discussing derivative rights approach).
129. Although the exceptional circumstance approach seeks to fulfill a child's best
interest, exceptional circumstances must first exist before the court may consider
awarding visitation rights to a grandparent. See Borzi, supra note 23. Likewise,
under the derivative rights approac\1, the grandparent's derivative right becomes
effective only upon the legal absence of the related parent. Fernandez, supra
note 23, at 118. "The grandparent may then petition for visitation with the
child, since the related parent is no longer able to ensure contact between
grandparent and child." [d.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29 (providing examples of exceptional
circumstances) .
131. See generally Brown v. Earnhardt, 396 S.E.2d 358 (S.C. 1990). In Brown, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina denied the paternal grandparents visitation
rights. [d. at 360. The court noted that the father of the children had liberal
visitation rights, and therefore, the paternal grandparents could visit the children
during that time. [d. at 359-60. The court held that the grandparents were not
"entitled to contend for autonomous visitation privileges absent a showing of
exceptional circumstances." [d. at 360.
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could a judge determine that grandparental visitation would or would
not be in the child's best interest. 132 The latter approach is more
workable and less likely to lead to harsh and unjust results.
Similarly, while simple to apply, the derivative rights alternative
is too restrictive. 133 Under this approach, a grandparent's rights are
not independent of the related parent's legal status. 134 Like the
exceptional circumstances approach, this standard may also fail to
fulfill a child's best interests. The fact that a child's father is not
entitled to visitation, for example, should not automatically bar the
paternal grandparents from visiting the child.13S Such an automatic
bar may be contrary to a child's best interest, especially where the
child and grandparents share a special relationship.
The exceptional circumstances approach and the derivative rights
theory fail, therefore, because they do not allow a court to determine
what is truly in a child's best interest. 136 Both approaches are too
simplistic given the complexities of the relationships involved., Only
the best interest standard furnishes a judge the freedom to adjudicate
these personal matters with an unrestricted sense of fairness.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals of Maryland correctly interpreted section
9-102 of the Family Law Article in Fairbanks v. McCarter. 137 The
court made clear that grandparents have an independent right to
petition a court for visitation rights with their grandchildren. 13B
Fairbanks held that "[t]he outcome of the grandparents' petition lies
within the sound discretion of the trial court, guided solely by the
132. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 50, 622 A.2d at 126 (stating that the "court should
assess in their totality all relevant factors and circumstances pertaining to the
grandchild's best interests").
133. See Fernandez, supra note 23, at 118-19.
134. [d.
135. [d.
136. The hypothetical example that follows i1h:lstrates how a mechanical approach
may fail to serve a child's best interests, but fulfill a parent's best interests.
The father gains custody of his children. The mother is denied visitation
privileges, and the father refuses to allow the maternal grandparents visitation
time with the children because of the father's ill feelings towards the maternal
grandparents. If a court applied the derivative rights approach, the maternal
grandparents would have no right to visitation simply because the mother of
the children had no right to visitation. Such a result may not be in the
children's best interest if the grandchildren and the maternal grandparents had
enjoyed a substantial and nurturing relationship prior to the divorce. It is,
however, in the father's best interest, because he does not want the children
to have contact with the maternal grandparents.
137. 330 Md. 39,622 A.2d 121 (1993).
138. [d. at 49, 622 A.2d at 126.
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best interests of the grandchild."139 The child's best interest is now
the exclusive consideration for Maryland's courts. Therefore, there
is no longer a requirement that exceptional circumstances exist before
a grandparent can be awarded visitation rights. Now, a court may
award grandparental visitation absent exceptional circumstances as
long as the visitation is determined to be in the child's best interests.
The child's best interest standard is the best approach to the
grandparental visitation issue. The very nature of these disputes
requires an in-depth inquiry into the specific facts and circumstances
of each family. Mechanical approaches, such as the exceptional
circumstances and derivative rights approaches, are too simplistic and
undermine the legislature's overall objective of fulfilling a child's
best interest.

Jacquelyn E. A vin

139: Id.

